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RÉSUMÉ
Dans le volume 50, no 4, décembre 2005, Maria Tymoczko nous présente brièvement 
quelques « Trajectoires de recherche en traductologie ». La première traite des tentatives 
de déﬁnir la traduction et l’auteur arrive à la conclusion qu’il s’agit d’une tâche difﬁcile, 
voire impossible. J’essaie de démontrer ici qu’il est parfaitement possible de déﬁnir ce 
qu’est la traduction : au lieu de contempler le problème du point de vue de la traductolo-
gie, nous l’examinons du point de vue de la philosophie.
ABSTRACT
In Volume 50, no 4, December 2005, Maria Tymoczko traces some “Trajectories of Research 
in Translation Studies” and the ﬁrst trajectory consisting in the difﬁculties even impossibil-
ity of deﬁning translation. I try to show here that it is perfectly possible to deﬁne transla-
tion if you look at it, not from the viewpoint of “Translations Studies” aka Traductologie, 
but from the viewpoint of philosophy.
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In Volume 50, no 4, December 2005, we ﬁnd Maria Tymoczko’s intervention in the 
plenary session of the International Conference “For a Proactive Translatology” 
celebrating the 50th META Anniversary. Her presentation sums up the principal 
trajectories of research in translation studies that are likely to be productive in the 
coming decades and the ﬁrst of those encompasses attempts to deﬁne translation. It 
would appear that there is no agreed deﬁnition of translation and what is more “such 
a deﬁnition is impossible because translation, like the concept game, discussed by 
Wittgenstein, is an open concept (Tymoczko 1998:654-56). In cognitive science such 
open concepts are sometimes called cluster concepts or cluster categories. Cluster 
concepts, such as the concepts game and language, both discussed by Wittgenstein, 
have certain interesting characteristics. In discussing language Wittgenstein remarks, 
“I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the 
same word for all, – but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And 
it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all ‘language’” 
(Philosophical Investigations (PI) 1953: section 65, original emphasis). Wittgenstein 
indicates that a cluster concept such as game or language is comprised of “a compli-
cated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similari-
ties, sometimes similarities of detail.... I can think of no better expression to characterize 
these similarities than ‘family resemblances’” (PI 1953, section 66-67).
I must confess I was perplexed with the way Maria Tymoczko quotes those 
Wittgenstein sentences. Wittgenstein always uses the expression “language game” or 
“language games” whereas Maria Tymoczko separates those two words and speaks of 
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‘game’ and then of ‘language.’ Why? If you separate those two words, you destroy 
Wittgenstein’s concept of “language games.” This is the more perplexing as in the very 
ﬁrst paragraph of the same section 65 Wittgenstein uses the expression “language-
games” both in the German original: ”Du redest von allen möglichen Sprachspielen, 
hast aber nirgendst gesagt, was denn das Wesentliche des Sprachspiels, und also der 
Sprache, ist” als in the English translation: “You talk about all sorts of language-games, 
but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game; and hence of language, is…” 
It is true that in section 66 Wittgenstein refers to other games, not language-games, 
but games like board-games, card-games, ball games, Olympic games, but it is always 
in a pair of words: X-games and he, Wittgenstein, speculates that if they are all called 
“games” they must have something in common. Of course, Wittgenstein is not think-
ing here of including the language-games in the same category as all those other 
“games.” We have to take into account the way Wittgenstein writes in the second part 
of his life. In contrast with the almost mathematical way of writing in the Tractatus 
when he was convinced of the truth of his simple propositions, the second Wittgenstein, 
who doubts everything, allows himself some literary frivolities like using the word 
“games” for something like “language uses.” The reader has to take into account and 
make the necessary readjustments. “Language-games” are “language uses,” also called 
“speech acts” in post-Wittgensteinian language philosophy1, referring to ways of using 
the language which means that language is a system that can be used in different ways. 
Indeed, Wittgenstein gives a list of examples of language uses in section 23: 
Giving orders and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements—
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
Reporting an event—
Speculating about an event—
…..




Making a joke; telling it—
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
Translating from one language into another—
This means that you can do many things with a language by using it and you can only 
use it in a speech act (or language game). One of those uses is to translate from one 
language into another which means that translation is a language game or speech act 
or a series of speech acts. Now we have the beginnings of a deﬁnition of translation: 
Translation is a language game or speech act or a series of language games or speech 
acts which consist of saying in a given language what has been said in previous speech 
acts in another language. 
WE CAN GET NEARER TO THE REALITY OF LANGUAGE  
AND TRANSLATION
Let me confess that I am also mystiﬁed by the fact that some translation theorists 
seem to discover aspects of translation that are in fact aspects of all “language games” 
not only of that language game that Wittgenstein calls translation. For example the 
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‘skopos theory’ which is deﬁned2 as “a translation theory that assigns great importance 
to the pragmatic aspects of the <text> and according to which the <target text> is essen-
tially determined by its function with respect to the <target audience> and not solely by 
the properties of the <source text>.” This theory is presented as if the fact of taking into 
account the people to whom you address your speech or your text only applies to 
translation when in fact it happens in all “language games” (speech acts). You always 
speak to somebody even if this somebody is yourself (inner speech). It is impossible 
to speak, orally or in writing, without ‘addressing’ your speech or text to somebody, 
present or absent. The skopos theory was not invented by any traductologist but by 
the philosopher Emilio Betti in 1962.3 
It is the other way round: all language games consist of a human being address-
ing another human being or human beings which explains why in the language game 
we call ‘translating’ we have the same situation, a human being called “text translator” 
or “conference interpreter” addressing other human beings. Text translators and 
simultaneous interpreters work in different social situations but they adapt con-
sciously or unconsciously to the circumstances of their own productions and those 
circumstances include the human beings addressed. This is, as I said, Betti’s skopos 
principle4 also kown as the hermeneutic principle of applicatio although this one 
might appear at ﬁrst sight to be slightly different. Gadamer, in his book Truth and 
Method (Wahrheit und Methode) contends that the meaning of a literary work is never 
exhausted by the intentions of its author5, the interpretation of future readers living in 
future moments, in different historical and cultural circumstances, will change the 
meaning of the work. A similar idea has also been developed by legal hermeneutics: 
the meaning of a law is not only the mens legislatoris or the mens legis but also (some 
say “above all”) its application to a concrete case perhaps many years later. Please take 
note that we are now speaking of a phenomenon called ‘meaning.’ What affects those 
people you are talking to is not your sentences but what you mean with those sen-
tences in that speech act as they experience it. 
Some traductologists think that to translate is an action which has a communica-
tive, a pragmatic and a semiotic dimension, and they are right, but it is because 
translating is a language game and all language games have those dimensions. And if 
this applies to all language games then Wittgenstein erred when he wrote that it is not 
possible to ﬁnd rules common to all of them. All language games (speech acts) are 
linguistic transactions with a communicative, a pragmatic, a semiotic and a social 
dimension and these four dimensions mean that all language games are social trans-
actions which produce social effects in some other people and/or the social circum-
stances of the speech act (or language game). Let us accept this for the time being 
until we take into account other general rules of all language games. 
WHAT IS MEANING?
We have reached the conclusion that translation is just another form of language game 
but there are plenty of language games. How can we differentiate between them? By 
ascertaining what the people playing the language game want to do. People speaking 
to give orders play a language game called ‘giving orders.’ If you have been in the army 
you know what that is. People describing the appearance of an object, or giving its 
measurements are playing a language game which is called “describing the appearance 
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or dimensions of an object.” And this applies to all language games including those 
in the list Wittgenstein gives as examples of language games… except for the last one 
on that list which is translating. What are people doing when they play the game of 
translating? The answer is well known: it is obvious that people translating, orally or 
in writing, do not reproduce the linguistic structures like words or sentences, they 
reproduce something else, namely, ‘what has been said.’ This ‘thing’ has been called 
‘meaning,’ ‘le sens,’ ‘sensum.’ Remember Jerome? Non verbum e verbo sed sensum 
exprimere de sensu. Translation is a transference or a reproduction of meanings and 
only that. And of course, there are hundreds of ways of doing that which is the subject 
matter of a science called Traductology or Translation Studies.
But if you think about it you will have to admit that in all language games there 
is a transference or reproduction of meaning, and not only in the translation game. 
People speaking to give orders play a language game called ‘giving orders’ but for these 
orders to be obeyed the soldier has to understand what the ofﬁcer means, that is to 
say, to give orders you need a transfer of meaning because you have to understand 
the order to execute it. The same applies to people describing the appearance of an 
object, or giving its measurements, they are playing a language game which is called 
‘describing the appearance or dimensions of an object’ but they have to get the mean-
ing across to the people they are addressing. And the same happens to the whole list 
of examples of language games that Wittgenstein gives, except one called ‘translation’ 
and the difference is that in translation you only do one thing, namely, understand a 
meaning meant by a speaker or writer and you just transmit that meaning without 
doing anything with that meaning as the soldier does when he receives an order. 
Transmitting meanings is a case of pure communication. 
In the translation game you have two successive language games (speech acts), a 
ﬁrst language game where a speaker or writer transmits a meaning to somebody using 
a given sign system and a second language game where the text translator or the inter-
preter re-transmits that same meaning to other people using a different sign system. 
The conclusion is a general rule: in all language games there is a transference of mean-
ing whether followed by an action or not but in the language game we call ‘translation’ 
there are two language games producing the same meaning with different sign systems 
and that’s all. We should add this to the deﬁnition of translation but before doing that 
we have to ask ourselves seriously what is this so-called ‘meaning’ which is produced 
and transmitted in all language games and happens twice in the two interrelated lan-
guage games we call ‘translation’ in its two forms: oral and written. The question is 
what is this ‘meaning’ that is produced and reproduced in all translation games? 
ARE WE TALKING OF MEANING OF WORDS AND SENTENCES?
Wittgenstein has suggested a famous deﬁnition of ‘meaning’ in section 43 of the same 
book6: For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word 
“meaning” it can be deﬁned thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” or as 
Valéry put it many years before: “le sens d’un mot est son emploi.” We have to under-
stand the expression “its use in the language” as “its use in a language game.” The 
trouble with these two deﬁnitions of meaning and many others like them is that they 
are referring to the meaning of a word and this does not apply either to the simulta-
neous interpreter’s job nor to the experience of the text translator. We do not translate 
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words, do we? We translate…. What? We don’t translate sentences either. Or shall I 
put it in a Wittgensteinian way and write: “in the great majority of cases we don’t 
translate either words or sentences”?
But if this is so what do we transfer? For a conference simultaneous interpreter 
living in an oral word the answer is easy: we reproduce the meanings which is what 
the Speaker wanted to say in a more or less short series of oral speech acts. When you 
have to translate a whole text, what do you reproduce? Can you say that the text 
translator reproduces with another sign system the meanings produced in a previous 
series of written speech acts? 
THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE CONCEPT OF MEANING
Is “meaning” a linguistic phenomenon? This is again easier to answer in the realm of 
orality where things happen like this: meaning meant by one and understood by the 
other is inseparable from the linguistic structures used but only for a short time 
because after a while the linguistic structures disappear and only the meaning remains 
in the memory of both the speaker and the hearer or at least in one of them. This is 
what is called the Jarvella Effect.7 It is obvious that this Jarvella Effect is a proof that 
the meaning meant and understood exists as an independent entity different from 
the linguistic structures because if the meaning meant were inseparable from the 
linguistic structures translation would be impossible. This is what seems to happen 
with sacred books like the Bible and the Koran where the meanings are supposed to 
be inseparably united with the linguistic structures but it does not happen in all the 
other cases. What shall we call this meaning that can be transported from one speech 
act in a given sign system to another speech act in a different sign system? Would it 
be useful to use the cognitivist term MR (Mental Representation)? 
COMRADE PAVLOV
It was about midday of the 18th day of June 1978, I had just ﬁnished the presentation 
of my PhD thesis and when I got out of the Sorbonne I found myself in the rue Saint 
Jacques, a street which runs parallel to the Sorbonne and ends in Santiago de 
Compostela. I came into the rue Soufﬂot in front of the Pantheon, which I have always 
considered the centre of Paris. I went down the Boul’Mich, walking towards the river. 
There are some bookshops there, I went into one of them, looked around, a book 
attracted my attention, a little book of the ‘que sais-je’ series, edited by the Presses 
Universitaires de France. The title was “Le langage et la pensée,” author Paul Chauchard, 
ﬁrst published in 1956. I went into a café and started reading. The second part is 
entitled ‘Les mécanismes cérébraux du langage’ (The brain mechanisms of language) 
and chapter two is entitled ‘Le second système de signalisation’ (The second signaliza-
tion system). In page 60 I found this: If, at the physiological level, language is just a 
particular case of conditioned reﬂexes, it was to the credit of Pavlov to show that language 
is a very particular aspect of human conditioning which establishes the superiority of his 
psychism. For Pavlov and his disciples language is the second signalization system. 
I went on reading and I found that with this word ‘signalization,’ Paul Chauchard 
was referring to the signals which are the main ingredients of perceptual systems so 
that, in the case of language, we can speak of second degree signals (ﬁrst the noise, 
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then the interpretation of that noise). There were some quotations of Pavlov himself 
and of some of his disciples like Follin and Ivanov Smolenski who developed Pavlov’s 
idea. The second quote of Pavlov dated 1932 says: “If our sensations and representations 
referring us to our environment represent for us the ﬁrst signals of reality, the concrete 
signals of language and, before everything else, the kinesthetic excitations (muscular feel-
ing) going from the talking organs towards the cortex, are the second signals, the signals 
of signals.’ They represent an abstraction of reality and make possible a generalization 
which is our speciﬁc thinking mode..” 
I realized what this meant: what we call “language” is a second degree perception 
system, you perceive ﬁrst noises and then, in a second perception phase, you perceive 
those noises as linguistic signs. Pavlov’s two disciples played with this idea developing 
the formulation. I was ﬂabbergasted. This changed everything: what we call ‘language,’ 
in orality for starters, is a second degree perception system and ‘meaning’ is the per-
cept produced by the perception process of that second degree perception system. 
Does it sound too exotic to you? Why? After all there is a linguistic science called…
PSYCHOLINGUISTICS
…which deals with something called language perception and there are thousands of 
books on that subject8 but, funnily enough they deal only with the ﬁrst stage of the 
whole process, the perception of linguistic noises. A classic book is Eric H. Lenneberg’s 
Biological Foundations of Language with appendices by Noam Chomsky and Otto 
Marx, 1967, which is considered as the ﬁrst stone of a new epoch in this discipline, 
full of interesting insights but unfortunately unable to disentangle the muddle 
between the word ‘cognition’ and the word ‘language processing.’ Lenneberg cannot 
see that these two words, cognition and language processing, refer to two aspects of 
the same perception phenomenon. Or the book by Herbert H. Clark and Eve V. Clark, 
Psychology and Language, An Introduction to Psycholinguistics,’ 1977, where on page 
407 you can read that The end of language is the communication of meaning. People 
talk in order to express the meaning of their thoughts, and they listen in order to discover 
the meaning of what others say. Without meaning there would be no real point in lan-
guage. But what is meaning?…. Bravo! That is the ﬁrst time, if I am not mistaken, that 
psycholinguists say that the communication of meaning is the purpose of language. 
But here starts a new muddle. What you read in this quote sounds quite well but it is 
not perfect ‘musically’ speaking. I am going to play that same melody with variations: 
The end of language is the production of meaning, it being understood that production 
and communication are two different words referring to the same reality. People talk to 
communicate ‘meanings,’ not the ‘meaning of thoughts’ because meanings and thoughts 
are one and the same thing. And they listen in order to get the meaning meant by others. 
How does that sound? Better? 
Another variation of the same melody: oral language is a second degree perceptual 
system which causes second degree percepts to produce communication which is the way 
humans live. People talk using linguistic-acoustic waves that produce in their interlocu-
tors percepts (which are also called thoughts, concepts, impressions, visions, imagination, 
etc.) and they listen in order to receive and share with their interlocutor those percepts. 
Without those percepts there is no point in having and using that second degree percep-
tual system. 
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Isn’t it extraordinary that psycholinguists dealing with speech perception have 
not managed to discover that not only the beginning of that speech perception but 
the whole process is a perceptual process? And if it is a perceptual process it has to 
end necessarily with the production of a percept which is what we, simultaneous 
interpreters and text translators, call ‘meaning.’ Let us not forget that speaking of 
perception, there is a radical difference between the perceptual process and the ﬁnal 
product. We are conscious of the ﬁnal product or percept but fortunately not of the 
whole process.
IT IS NOT SO EASY AS THAT 
It is my conviction that for scientiﬁc reasons it is better to concentrate ﬁrst on the 
oral language games if we want to perceive clearly what ‘meaning’ is, but before that 
we have to take brieﬂy into account writing and inner speech. To simplify matters, let 
me postulate in telegraphic style some general propositions to cover the whole con-
ceptual ﬁeld. 
1. What we call ‘language’ in everyday parlance is in fact a species speciﬁc perceptual 
process of the homo loquens which has gone through a complex millenary evolution 
(something between more or less 200,000 years) in such a way that we can speak of 
how an acoustic perception process evolves into a second degree perception process 
(pure orality) followed thousands of years later by a third degree perception system 
which we call ‘writing-reading’ and ﬁnally followed by a fourth perception system 
called ‘inner speech’ (sometimes also called ‘mind’ or ‘selfconsciousness’). 
2. Every perception process entails a relationship of the animal with its environment. 
The usefulness of the word ‘intentionality,’ if we want to use it here, is that it adds the 
notion of activity of the animal to the idea of perception which otherwise seems to 
depict an animal which receives passively an inﬂux of electromagnetic waves. 
3. In every perception process we have three phases. First phase: there is ﬁrst of all a 
series of electromagnetic waves coming from the environment and penetrating the 
brain setting in motion a process (Second Phase) which, guided by a ‘mind,’ ends in 
a Third Phase called a ‘percept.’ Nobody can deny that there is an obvious difference 
between the perception process and its result. The animal is not conscious of the 
process, only of the resulting percept. This is a description of a ﬁrst degree perception 
process (animal perception) which homo loquens shares with many other species. 
4. Each stream of perceptions is an event in time, it starts at a certain moment and it 
stops a bit later. 
5. In the homo loquens second degree perception process, also known as orality, a 
stream of electromagnetic acoustic waves emanating this time not from the natural 
environment but from the social environment, that is, from a member of the same 
species, penetrates the brain of another member of that species setting in motion a 
complex perceptual process piloted by the mind9 that ends with the production of a 
percept containing a mass of information about the environment. The homo loquens 
is not conscious of the perceptual process but only of the resulting percept if at all. 
That is to say homo loquens in a second degree perception process is not aware of what 
grammarians and linguists call signs which are present in writing but which are not 
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perceivable in the second degree perception process (pure orality) so that one could 
say, as Derrida does,10 that they do not exist at all in orality. 
6. If the electromagnetic acoustic waves in this second degree perception process 
emanate, not from the natural environment but from another member of the homo 
loquens species, this means that they come from a social ‘environment,’ not a natural 
one, and social ‘environment’ has an ontological status different from the natural or 
cosmic environment. This social ‘environment’ is called ‘society’ (I have found it use-
ful to call it “injectivity” as opposed to “objectivity”). 
7. Also in this case we can say that this stream of perceptions is an event in time and 
space which is what we call the speech act (“language game”), a social transaction that 
presupposes the existence of a whole society (from the aboriginal tribe to the world 
society).
8. In the homo loquens third degree perception process the oral electromagnetic waves 
of the second degree perception process:
• are transformed into written signs and which are perceived as such by both commu-
nication poles in the writing act (writer-reader) and 
• in order to decipher these signs both the writer and the reader unconsciously refer 
back to the oral value of those signs in a sort of retro-perception of the oral expe-
rience.
9. In what I call the homo loquens fourth degree perception process (inner speech) 
both oral and written signs are ‘interiorized’ in an inner mental communication 
process between two internalized social personae. 
10. It must be understood that these three homo loquens perceptual systems produce, 
as I pointed out, a perception of a species speciﬁc ‘environment’ which is called ‘soci-
ety’ and this society is a new ontological ‘mass’11 in which we ﬁnd actors acting in 
social spaces called ‘situations.’ The result is that the homo loquens lives in two differ-
ent environments, a natural one, and a social one. These two environments transmit 
perceptual information that is further elaborated and accumulated in the constant 
communication network produced by the three species-speciﬁc perceptual systems: 
World Network of Speech Acts (“language games”). 
11. These two environments are as follows: ﬁrst the natural environment called objec-
tive reality which exists without us (cosmos, including our body), and, second, society 
which I also call public subjective reality as opposed to objectivity, and this public sub-
jective reality has in turn two aspects: 
• a soft injectivity or mental aspect which includes masses of information,12 what we 
call the collective mind produced by the constant World Network of Speech Acts 
(“language games”) connecting all languages through the mediation of translation in 
all its forms, and 
• a second aspect, namely, all the artifacts we, societal animals, manufacture, like books, 
signs of all kinds, houses, roads, cars, chairs, computers, airports, theatres, swimming 
pools, pianos, atomic bombs, etc. which I call heavy injectivity because you can touch 
those artifacts. Needless to say, none of these artifacts would be there without society 
and its contents. 
12. The workings and functioning of the homo loquens brain, and, therefore, of what 
we call ‘mind,’ depend on the information transmitted by perception received from 
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the two above mentioned environments. It is impossible to understand the workings 
of the brain we call ‘mind’ without taking into account the constant information 
ﬂowing into the brain through perception from the objective reality (natural environ-
ment or cosmos) and from the injective reality (society). The mind would not exist 
without this information coming from outside the body. The best thing is to consider 
the whole chain as a ‘system’ or better still as a ‘ﬁeld’ which we could call the society-
perception-language-mind system (SPLMS). My contention is that in order to under-
stand what the so-called language and the so-called mind are you have to consider 
the totality of the SPLMS. 
13. I postulate that the World Network of ‘speech acts (“language games”) creates a 
constant state of communication in all society –nowadays practically the whole 
planet– which is what I call soft injective reality.. 
DEFINITION OF TRANSLATION
First, a deﬁnition of the so-called language: what we call “language” is a perceptual 
system and therefore, there is a difference between the acoustic (or written) perceptual 
waves, the process of perception and the resulting percept. 
Second, a deﬁnition of translation: translators reproduce with a second sign system 
(language) in a second speech act (‘language game’) the percepts produced by other 
speakers/writers in a ﬁrst speech act (‘language game’) with a ﬁrst sign system. 
NOTES
1. John R. Searle, Speech Acts, An Essay in the Philosophy of Language, CUP, ﬁrst published in 1969, that 
is, 16 years after the publication of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.
2. Jean Delisle, Hannelore Lee-Jahnke and Monique C.Corner, Translation Terminology, Volume I, page 
179, published by John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1999.
3. Emilio Betti, Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften, J.C.B.Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), Tübingen, 1962.
4. Loc. cit.
5. Eagleton (1983): Literary Theory: An Introduction, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
6. PI = Philosophical Investigations.
7. After a while you remember the meaning but not the words. Jarvella, R. 1971 Syntactic processing of 
connected speech. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 10, 409--416.). The Jarvella Efect 
is what Danitsa Seleskovitch called “évanescence des mots” (evanescence of words) or “absence de trace 
mnésique” (absence of mnemonic mark) (Seleskovitch 1968). Seleskovitch’s theory says that what 
leaves a “trace mnésique,” are not the signs but the meaning. You remember what has been said but 
not the words or sentences. It is generally accepted, even by cognitive psychology, that verbal 
memory is weak and that the phonological sequences disappear after some seconds. Between 1970 
and 1972 Jarvella did a series of experiments presenting speech or text to people and stopping them 
suddenly to ask them to repeat what they had just heard or read. Result: verbal memory of the last 
sentence or part of it was still rather good but not for the previous sentences. We can reach the 
conclusion that the comprehension process (or as I call it, the perceptual process) forgets the ‘lin-
guistic material’ once the percept has been produced (once the meaning has been produced).
8. One of the latest is Handbook of Speech Perception, edited by David B.Pisoni and Robert Ellis Remez. 
Blackwell, published in February 2005 which is a collection of pieces by quite a number of people, 
all of them dealing with the ﬁrst face of the language perception process, namely, auditory and speech 
processes, sensing speech, perceptual organization of speech, phonetic processing by the speech 
perceiving brain, perception of linguistic properties, perception of intonation, perception of voice 
quality, etc., anything except the ﬁnal phase of the process which is the production of a percept 
because there is no perception without the production of a percept. 
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9. Donald D. in Visual intelligence, How we Create what we See, 1998 enumerates a series of rules like 
this one: you construct visual worlds from ambiguous images in conformance to visual rules 
(Hoffman 98:24). 
10. The exteriority of the signiﬁer is the exteriority of writing in general, and I shall try to show that there 
is no linguistic sign before writing. Without that exteriority the very idea of the sign falls into decay. 
Derrida, Of Grammatology, English translation, page 14.
11. John P. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 1995.
12. Emile Durkheim writes: Social Life Is Constituted Wholly Of ‘Collective Representations.’ The Rules of 
Sociological Method, second edition, 1895.
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